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1. Ontology 
The book seeks to answer the following question: What is an ontology that is minimally 
sufficient to accommodate the known physics as well as our common sense knowledge about 
the natural world? The answer developed in the book is that the commitment to matter points 
individuated by distance relations and the change of these relations constitutes such a 
minimalist ontology. The issue is minimal sufficiency. There is no claim about necessity or a 
priori. This ontology obviously is akin to Descartes’ view of nature as res extensa, which can 
also be seen as a kind of minimal sufficiency claim, but we do not share Desscartes’ concerns 
about necessity and a priori. Minimal sufficiency, not necessity means that there may be 
other proposals that are also minimally sufficient as an ontology of the natural world. We are 
open to this possibility (although, for our part, we are happy to have developed just one 
possibility). We agree with Alastair Wilson “that the correct ontology is the one which offers 
the best overall explanation of the facts – including the epistemological facts”. That these 
facts boil down to evidence about relative positions of discrete objects and their change may 
be taken as motivation to try out the ontology proposed in the book; but it is not the argument 
for this ontology. The argument is that this ontology offers the overall best explanation: less 
commitments would deprive us of an explanation; more commitments would not lead to an 
explanatory gain, but only to trouble in the ontology. 
 
Hence, the proposal set out in the book may be wrong-headed for three reasons: 
a) The proposal is not minimally sufficient, that is, it contains redundant commitments: one 
can do with less ontological commitments. 
b) The proposal is not sufficient, that is, more ontological commitments are required to 
accommodate the known physics as well as our common sense knowledge. 
c) The proposal is overambitious, that is, physics (not to mention common sense) is too 
diverse so that no single ontology can accommodate the whole of physics. 
The suspicion that the book is in fact engaged in a priori metaphysics and is after necessity 
derives from (c). Since most of today’s philosophy of physics is concerned with the analysis 
of particular physical theories, the claim that there is a single ontology that covers the whole 
of physics may appear to be as old-fashioned as a priori and necessity claims are when it 
comes to scientific metaphysics. But this is just our claim: there is at least one fundamental 
ontology available that accommodates the whole of physics, and this claim is worked out in 
detail for classical, relativistic and quantum physics in the book. So the question is not 
whether this claim has a smell of a priori or necessity, but whether it achieves what it sets out 
to do, that is, whether it provides a coherent ontology for the existing physical theories. Of 
course, pursuing such a project requires taking a stance on controversial issues in the 
interpretation of physical theories, in particular when it comes to quantum physics. George 
Darby takes this to be a drawback of our project. But there is no ontology of the natural world 
based on science that remains neutral with respect to these controversies. In particular, any 
proposal for an ontology in the domain of quantum physics has to provide a solution to the 
measurement problem. The thesis argued for in the book is that the proposed minimalist 
ontology enables the formulation of a cogent solution of this problem. 
 
In a certain sense, Anna Marmodoro takes issue with (a). Her concern is not that the ontology 
that we propose is too rich. She has reservations about us admitting three irreducible 
primitives: “matter points”, “distances” and “change”. Her comments can be taken to suggest 
that we could just do with distance relations as primitive and derive objects as well as change 
from these relations. However, as Marmodoro acknowledges, the ontic structural realism that 
we endorse is a moderate one. Its being moderate means that we accept both objects and 
relations as primitives. All there is to the objects is their standing in relations such that the 
relations individuate the objects. But letting relations individuate objects does not amount to 
deriving objects from relations, since relations still require relata as a primitive (see Esfeld 
and Lam 2011). We do not see how objects could be derived from relations (nor do we 
understand how, in a (neo-)Aristotelian metaphysics, relations could be derived from objects). 
 
The issue then is whether, given objects individuated by relations, there is an answer to the 
following question: What is the origin of change? We postulate the change in the distance 
relations as a further primitive. Nonetheless, it may be possible to merge our two axioms in 
one by conceiving the distance relations in such a way that it is in their nature to change. We 
are open to this possibility, as we remain finally neutral on the metaphysics of modality (cf. p. 
56 of the book). However, enriching the ontology by admitting primitive modal entities in the 
guise of powers would not answer the question why there is change at all. Powers are powers 
for a certain change to occur (their manifestation), that is, one particular change in contrast to 
other particular changes; but this does not answer the question why they manifest at all. 
Simply saying that is in the nature of powers to manifest would not be an illumniating answer 
to that question in the same way as it would not be an informative answer to the question why 
there is change to simply say that it is in the nature of the distance relations to change. 
 
In any case, all that science gives us are distance relations connecting point particles and 
parameters that are introduced in terms of their functional role for the evolution of the 
distance relations. That is why the commitment to powers for particular changes does not lead 
to an explanatory gain. However, we have not always polished up the language that we use in 
line with the (Super-)Humeanism that is implicit in our axioms. We may occasionally speak 
of laws as governing, or of the wave function as acting on points in configuration space. But 
these are metaphorical ways of speaking. There is change, and there is our representation of 
change by means of laws, wave functions, etc. Our ontology does not have the burden to give 
an account of how laws or wave functions govern or “communicate” with physical systems. 
 
We do not claim originality for our conception of materiality in terms of matter points 
individuated by distance relations and their change. We take it to be an elaboration on 
Desccartes’ view of nature as characterized only by extension and motion, which laid the 
ground for modern science. Anna Marmodoro correctly points out that our conception of the 
distance relations goes far beyond the claim that everything in the natural world is spatially 
related to everything else. We subscribe to a substantial holism in taking these relations to 
provide for the identity of their relata. Nonetheless, we would not call this stance “geometrical 
holism”, for two reasons: (a) the term “geometrical” may be misleading because the distance 
relations do not come with a particular geometry; (b) the issue are relations that individuate 
objects. But these do not have to be distances; as we mention in the book (21, 162), there may 
also be other relations, such as thinking relations individuating mind points. In brief, this 
holism just is (moderate) ontic structural realism, with the structures being the distance 
relations. There is nothing original in our conception of holism as a horizontal one, consisting 
in relations that individuate objects (see Pettit 1993, chs. 3-4, and Esfeld 1998). 
 
This metaphysical holism is indeed distinct from the dynamical, or physical holism that is 
implemented in any fundamental physical theory due to the fact that its dynamical structure 
concerns the whole universe at once and subsystems of the universe only derivatively. This 
metaphysical holism paves the way for this dynamical holism in the sense that any change in 
the identity providing relations is a change that concerns all the elements in the system; as we 
point out in the book (40), this holds for instance also for semantic holism. However, what 
precise form this dynamical holism takes depends on the change that actually occurs. On 
Humeanism, the change comes first, and then comes the dynamical structure of a physical 
theory to represent that change in a manner that optizimes simplicity and informational 
content. Since we consider the change to be continuous, it provides for an identity of the 
matter points across all change, as there always is a non-vanishing distance between any two 
matter points. In a nutshell, we take permanent matter points with permanently changing 
distance relations to implement the best of both Parmenidian and Heraclitean metaphysics. 
 
In making the commitment to a substantial, metaphysical holism, our position, dubbed Super-
Humeanism, deviates from the standard, Lewisian Humeanism as well as from George 
Darby’s Almost-Lewisian Humeanism. Indeed, it is more radical than these forms of 
Humeanism: the Lewis-style Humean is not only committed to point particles and distance 
relations, but also to intrinsic properties of the point particles (for which mass and charge may 
count as paradigm examples), and she may include fields in the mosaic if they can be 
conceived as intrinsic properties of points (but runs into notorious difficulties mentioned by 
Darby if she intends to include also the quantum state in the supervenience basis, since the 
quantum state cannot be construed as intrinsic properties of point objects, at least not in 
ordinary space). The argument for deleting the commitment to intrinsic properties consequent 
upon taking the matter points to be individuated by the distance relations is not only the gain 
in parsimony—given that intrinsic properties can be dispensed with in the ontology of 
physics—but also avoiding the costs that come with the commitment to quidditism, if the 
intrinsic properties are construed as categorical properties (as they have to be on Humeanism). 
George Darby enquires into the objections to quidditism and whether the shift to distance 
relations can really avoid quidditism. Whatever weight one may attribute to these objections, 
if a position can do without the commitment to quidditism, it is, other things being equal, 
preferable. 
 
The commitment to quidditism arises if and only if there is a separation between the essence 
or nature of a property and the functional or causal role that it plays. However, there is no 
such separation in the case of distance relations. They are not causal relations. The dynamical 
structure, including the geometry, that a physical theory uses is introduced in terms of its 
causal or functional role for the change in the distance relations. But this implies that the 
distance relations themselves do not have a causal or functional role to play, on pain of an 
infinite regress of causal or functional roles. They are the bedrock, the primitive ontology, 
described by the basic, primitive notions; with respect to them all the other notions can then 
be introduced in terms of their functional role for them. Consequently, the issue of quidditism 
does not arise in the case of the distance relations. They are the only type of irreducible 
relations recognized in the Super-Humean ontology, and they do not admit of degrees. 
Furthermore, they are directly linked to the empirical evidence insofar as all the experimental 
evidence consists in the relative positions of discrete objects and the change of these 
positions. This, again, singles out the distance relations – although, as mentioned above, the 
argument for going for them as the ontological primitives is the overall coherence and 
explanatory fruitfulness of the resulting position. 
 2. Explanation 
Alastair Wilson – and to a certain extent also Anna Marmodoro – take the proposed 
ontology to be deficient for explanations. According to Wilson, this ontology leads to 
instrumentalism with respect to everything else apart from the ontological primitives. He is 
thus concerned with point (b) above: the proposed ontology may be sufficient, but it comes 
with a high cost for explanations that richer ontologies avoid. However, when defending the 
parsimonious ontology, the Super-Humean can adopt the same strategy as the standard 
Humean. There are patterns (stable regularities) in the change of the distance relations among 
the matter points, that is, their motion. Thus, some matter points move electronwise. 
Therefore, they are electrons and have negative charge. The only issue here is that being an 
electron and having negative charge are not intrinsic properties, but are derived from patterns 
in motion. But being derived from something else does not make charge unreal or a mere 
instrument for predictions. This is the same treatment that Humeans adopt, for instance, with 
respect to causation: it is not a relation between pairs of events; whether or not two events are 
related as cause and effect depends on a stable regularity. 
 
As quoted in the introduction to the book, Jackson’s recommendation for ontology is to “do 
with as meagre a diet as possible” (1994, 25). He then stresses that because ontology should 
be parsimonious, “there is bound to be a whole range of putative features of our world up for 
either elimination or location” (1994, 25). In our project, mass, charge, etc. are features of the 
world that are up for location, not elimination. If matter points, distance relations and change 
of distance relations are the basic notions, then everything else has to be located in 
configurations of matter points and their change. This is done via a functional definition of 
everything else in terms of its functional role for the change in the distance relations, which 
then enables us to locate gravitational mass, charge, etc. in certain patterns of motion. 
 The same goes for the quantum state: it encodes also certain patterns of motion of quantum 
objects that become manifest in experimental contexts. It is true that the ontology of distance 
relations and their change only does not significantly restrict the kinematic possibilities for 
the matter points (since, for us, the geometry is part and parcel of the dynamical structure). 
The significant restrictions are the dynamical ones, that is, those coming from the dynamical 
structure. However, in contrast to what Wilson suggests, in order to be entitled to use these 
restrictions in explanations, one does not have to regard the state space as belonging to the 
fundamental ontology. It can be taken to be derived from the parsimonious ontology of matter 
points and change in their distance relations only by means of the location procedure that 
Jackson describes, namely by locating the restrictions that the state space imposes in the 
salient patterns of the evolution of the distance relations among the matter points. 
 
George Darby is right in emphasizing that applying this view to the quantum state 
presupposes an ontology of quantum physics in terms of what is known as a primitive 
ontology of physical objects in ordinary space-time. The quantum state then is defined in 
terms of its functional role for the evolution of these objects. The argument for this stance – 
and notably for spelling out the primitive ontology in terms of persistent particles – is that it 
offers the best solution to the measurement problem, as argued in the book. This argument is 
independent of the proposed ontology. It then shows how this ontology can be implemented 
in a precise physical theory of quantum mechanics, here in the guise of Bohmian mechanics. 
Once this argument is granted, there is indeed nothing fundamentally new or puzzling about 
the quantum state. It belongs to the dynamical structure, as do mass and charge. Consider the 
point that Bell (1987, 35) seeks to make when he says that “The electron need not turn out to 
be a small spinning yellow sphere”. As Bell emphasizes, spin is not an intrinsic property of 
quantum systems, but a certain pattern of motion that shows up in certain experimental 
contexts. 
 
Once we have identified the basic, salient regularities of particle motion, we have reached the 
bedrock. Indeed, the whole story could in principle be told by using only the notions of matter 
points, distance relations and change in distance relations; all explanations – including the one 
why salt dissolves in water – could in principle be framed by employing only these notions. 
But this would be inconvenient, for it would not flag the salient patterns in the change in the 
distance relations by using notions that lable precisely these patterns. That is what notions 
such as mass, charge, spin, quantum state, etc. do. Explanations that rely on them are 
explanations that show how particular phenomena come under these salient patterns (and one 
may then spell out these explanations in terms of unification, or in terms of – Humean – 
causation). Taking these salient patterns for granted, the explanations in terms of these 
notions bring out constraints on what can and what cannot happen. 
 
However, there is no scientific explanation of why there are the salient patterns of particle 
motion that there are in fact. If one wants notions such as mass, charge, spin, quantum state, 
etc. to yield such an explanation, one has to lift the status of these notions to referring to 
ingredients of the basic ontology that there are over and above matter points, distance 
relations and the change in these relations. But this is futile. These notions are defined in 
terms of their functional role for the particle motion. Consequently, explanations of why there 
are the salient patterns in the particle motion that there are in fact in terms of these notions 
would be circular. Thus, one does not explain why particles attract each other in terms of 
gravitational mass, since gravitational mass is defined in terms of its functional role for 
particle attraction, etc. Hence, there is no gain in explanation here. 
 
When it comes to ontology, taking these notions to refer to additional elements of the basic 
ontology only leads to well-known trouble. If mass, charge, spin, etc. are categorical, intrinsic 
properties of the particles, one runs into the trouble associated with quidditism and humility. 
If they are dispositional properties or powers, the problem is how they manifest themselves, 
notably how a power intrinsic to one particle can manifest itself in the acceleration of other 
particles. When it comes to the quantum state as represented by the wave function, the 
problem is that this state cannot be conceived as an entity that exists in physical space in 
addition to the particles and their motion, etc. In brief, a constraint in terms of irreducibly 
modal elements in the basic ontology over and above the particles and their motion does not 
lead to a gain in explanation and entails only trouble in the ontology. Any constraint that 
comes with ordinary scientific explanations is accounted for by us in terms of the mentioned 
location in (or identification of) salient patterns of particle motion. This assessment does not 
infringe upon us remaining finally neutral with respect to the metaphysics of modality. We 
only claim that the notions that scientists employ in formulating dynamical structures of 
physical theories do not reveal irreducibly modal elements of the world, but are located in 
salient patterns of particle motion. This may be considered as modesty with respect to what 
physics achieves; but it is not instrumentalism, and it fully respects the explanations that 
physics provides. 
 
3. Physics: quantum field theory 
When it comes to quantum field theory (QFT) by contrast to quantum mechanics, we agree 
with Adam Caulton that “No rigorous, realistic, relativistic quantum field theory (…) is 
known to exist”. In fact, the situation is similarly bad for classical field theory. There, the 
only rigorously constructed models are either free of interaction (e.g. the evolution of 
Maxwell fields for prescribed currents) or describe charge densities that explode if no extra 
boundary conditions are supplied (e.g. Maxwell-Vlasov dynamics). The root of the problem is 
that most attempts in specifying a relativistic interaction are based on a notion of interaction 
between what occurs at space-time points, simply because the point is one of the few Lorentz 
invariant geometric objects – the other one being the hyperbola, which does not seem to be 
experimentally adequate. In order to describe radiation friction, however, it seems necessary 
to implement also an interaction at zero distances (one famous exception being Wheeler-
Feynman electrodynamics). These so-called self-interaction terms are usualy ill-defined and 
their problems are directly inherited by the corresponding quantum field theories. Thus, 
strictly speaking, no rigorous, realistic field theory of interactions is known to exist, quantum 
or classical. In both cases, quantum and classical, this leaves those interested in ontology with 
two options: wait until such a theory will exist, or work out an ontology for the theory that we 
have at hand, however provisional such an ontology may be. We are concerned with the latter 
project in chapter 4 of the book. Our only aim in that chapter is to reply to the challenge that 
an ontology in terms of permanent matter points that are individuated by distance relations 
and their change is a non-starter when it comes to QFT, given notably the evidence of what is 
described as particle creation and annihilation phenomena. In other words, we cannot remain 
silent on QFT on pain of falling victim to this challenge. 
 
Our choice of ontology for quantum physics is constrained by the measurement problem. We 
take an ontology of permanent particles with a law of motion for these particles (i.e. the 
Bohmian framework) to provide the best solution to the measurement problem. This problem 
hits QFT in the same way as non-relativistic quantum mechanics. This is the motivation for 
trying out the same solution for QFT. Hence, there is a positive reason to adopt the Bohmian 
ontology of permanent particles, namely that it is the best solution to the measurement 
problem. 
 
Thus, we set out to show that a Bohmian ontology of permanent particles with a deterministic 
law of motion for these particles can do the same for QFT (as it stands) as for quantum 
mechanics. This explains the choice of a particle ontology for QFT. No field ontology has 
been worked out that can account for the particle evidence in the experimental results. An 
ontology of both particles and fields would run into the well-known interaction problems, that 
is, would lift these problems from mathematical problems in the dynamical structure of all 
known field theories to problems in the basic ontology. (What comes closest to a field 
ontology is the GRWm ontology of a matter density field in quantum mechanics; but also the 
formalism of this theory is construed in terms of a fixed number of permanent particles. 
Furthermore, this ontology commits one to realism about wave function collapse with, in this 
case, the unpalatable consequence of having to countenance an instantaneous delocation of 
matter across arbitrarily big distances in space upon wave function collapse, as explained in 
chapter 3.3 of the book). 
 
Against this background, it is clear that we are concerned with conventional, or cutoff 
quantum field theory (CQFT). This theory, by contrast to the algebraic, or axiomatic quantum 
field theory, and when subject to a well-defined and finite renormalization scheme, leads to a 
whole range of well-confirmed experimental predictions, given suitable cut-offs. Hence, this 
is the appropriate theory upon which to base the enquiry into an ontology of QFT. In our case 
we rely on the Dirac sea model that describes the electron sector of the standard model under 
the influence of external fields and which is also widely used to describe the next-generation 
experiments such as those ones planned at the ELI (Extreme Light Infrastructure). We then 
show how an ontology of a very large, but finite number of matter points that persist and that 
are subject to a deterministic law of motion results in the statistical predictions of CQFT, 
given appropriate cut-offs. In brief, as it is a mistake in quantum mechanics to infer from the 
Heisenberg uncertainty relations that there are no particle trajections, so it is a mistake to infer 
from the appearance and disappearance of particles in characteristic QFT experiments that 
there are no persistent particles. The commitment to persistent particles moving on 
trajectories that result from a deterministic law of motion provides in both cases a cogent 
ontology that accounts for the statistical predictions and experimental results. These are 
particle detection statistics. 
 
Contrary to what Adam Caulton claims, J, the current, is an operator in QED and not a charge 
density valued field. It has to be sandwiched by states to form an expectation value, which 
then is about particle detection statistics. These particle detection statistics are what is 
measured, for instance, at CERN – precise energy deposits in precise solid angles with respect 
to the impact zone of the scattering experiment. The operator J encodes the statistics of them. 
The ontology tells us about what these statistics are, namely about particle positions. In other 
words, the particles serve as truthmaker and explanation why we see a point and not a 
smeared out dot at the experiments in CERN. In the same vein also the electron and positron 
particle number operators are only operators and not numbers of particles. As we point out in 
the book, these do the bookkeeping of the statistics of the number of Fock excitations with 
respect to an arbitrarily chosen reference state. As the rigorous construction of the time-
evolution of the Dirac sea model without cut-offs can only be implemented between time-
varying Focks spaces – that is, with respect to time-varying reference states –, these operators 
constantly change their meaning over time (informally, they can be seen as undergoing time-
dependent Bogoliubov transformations). In fact, the electron and positron number opertors 
with respect to the fixed free vacuum state are in general even ill-defined on space-like 
Cauchy surfaces that intersect the support of the external influences. Hence, extreme caution 
is advisable when interpreting the statistics that these operators encode. Nevertheless, the 
proposed ontology provides the means to start developing detector models, that is, singling 
out appropriate detector reference states with respect to which the click statistics can be 
encoded by means of the corresponding particle number operators. The latter will prove to be 
a highly non-trivial and very technical task, which we did not dare to touch in this book. 
 
Indeed, as Caulton says, the standard model of particle physics may turn out to be wrong well 
before we reach the Planck length. But then, when we have new physics, we have to go over 
the metaphysical books again. All that we claim in the book is that the commitments to matter 
points individuated by distance relations and the change in these relations provides a 
minimally sufficient ontology for the existing physics that accommodates all the explanatory 
power that this physics has. 
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